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This book continues and revises the ideas of justice as fairness that John Rawls presented in "A Theory of Justice" but changes its philosophical interpretation in a fundamental way. That previous work assumed what Rawls calls a "well-ordered society," one that is stable and relatively homogenous in its basic moral beliefs and in which there is broad agreement about what This book continues and revises the ideas of justice as fairness that John Rawls presented in "A Theory of Justice" but changes its philosophical interpretation in a fundamental way. That previous work assumed what Rawls calls a "well-ordered society," one that is stable and relatively homogenous in its basic moral beliefs and in which there is broad agreement about what constitutes the good life. Yet in modern democratic society a plurality of incompatible and irreconcilable doctrines--religious, philosophical, and moral--coexist within the framework of democratic institutions. Recognizing this as a permanent condition of democracy, Rawls asks how a stable and just society of free and equal citizens can live in concord when divided by reasonable but incompatible doctrines? This edition includes the essay "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," which outlines Rawls' plans to revise "Political Liberalism, " which were cut short by his death. "An extraordinary well-reasoned commentary on "A Theory of Justice."..a decisive turn towards political philosophy." --"Times Literary Supplement"


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This book continues and revises the ideas of justice as fairness that John Rawls presented in "A Theory of Justice" but changes its philosophical interpretation in a fundamental way. That previous work assumed what Rawls calls a "well-ordered society," one that is stable and relatively homogenous in its basic moral beliefs and in which there is broad agreement about what This book continues and revises the ideas of justice as fairness that John Rawls presented in "A Theory of Justice" but changes its philosophical interpretation in a fundamental way. That previous work assumed what Rawls calls a "well-ordered society," one that is stable and relatively homogenous in its basic moral beliefs and in which there is broad agreement about what constitutes the good life. Yet in modern democratic society a plurality of incompatible and irreconcilable doctrines--religious, philosophical, and moral--coexist within the framework of democratic institutions. Recognizing this as a permanent condition of democracy, Rawls asks how a stable and just society of free and equal citizens can live in concord when divided by reasonable but incompatible doctrines? This edition includes the essay "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," which outlines Rawls' plans to revise "Political Liberalism, " which were cut short by his death. "An extraordinary well-reasoned commentary on "A Theory of Justice."..a decisive turn towards political philosophy." --"Times Literary Supplement"

30 review for Political Liberalism

  1. 4 out of 5

    Ali

    مساله مورد بررسی رالز در لیبرالیسم سیاسی دو پرسش بنیادین زیر است: نخستین پرسش: برای تعیین شروط منصفانه همکاری اجتماعی میان شهروندانی که آزاد و برابر تلقی می شوند درخورترین برداشت از عدالت چیست؟ دومین پرسش: با توجه به واقعیت تکثرگرایی معقول چونان نتیجه گریزناپذیر توان های عقل انسان، که در درون نهادهای آزاد دیرپا عمل می کنند، دلایل رواداری به معنای عام کدامند؟ با در هم آمیختن این دو پرسش به این یک پرسش می رسیم: چگونه ممکن است که یک جامعه عادلانه و پایدار متشکل از شهروندان آزاد و برابری که بر پایه مساله مورد بررسی رالز در لیبرالیسم سیاسی دو پرسش بنیادین زیر است: نخستین پرسش: برای تعیین شروط منصفانه همکاری اجتماعی میان شهروندانی که آزاد و برابر تلقی می شوند درخورترین برداشت از عدالت چیست؟ دومین پرسش: با توجه به واقعیت تکثرگرایی معقول چونان نتیجه گریزناپذیر توان های عقل انسان، که در درون نهادهای آزاد دیرپا عمل می کنند، دلایل رواداری به معنای عام کدامند؟ با در هم آمیختن این دو پرسش به این یک پرسش می رسیم: چگونه ممکن است که یک جامعه عادلانه و پایدار متشکل از شهروندان آزاد و برابری که بر پایه آموزه های معقول دینی، فلسفی و اخلاقی همچنان در گروه های بسیار متفاوت می مانند، در گذر زمان بپاید؟ قید "تکثرگرایی معقول" در بررسی رالز از اهمیت اساسی برخوردار است. رالز در توصیف اشخاص معقول می نویسد: اشخاص از یک جنبه اساسی معقول اند هر گاه آماده باشند اصول و استانده هایی را چونان شروط منصفانه همکاری پیشنهاد کنند و به دلخواه خویش بدان ها وفادار بمانند، با فرض اطمینان از این که دیگران نیز چنان خواهند کرد. آنان پذیرش آن هنجارها برای هر کس را معقول، و بدین سان توجیه پذیر می دانند؛ و آماده اند به بررسی شروط منصفانه پیشنهادی دیگران بپردازند. از توضیحات فوق پیداست که نظریه رالز به کار جوامعی که در آن اکثریت به برداشت سنتی از ادیان توحیدی یا هر آموزه فراگیر نامعقول/نارورادار دیگر معتقدند، نمی آید. رالز در شرح فرآیند شکل گیری اجماع بر سر قانون اساسی، نحوه تبدیل نگرش های فراگیر شهروندان به نگرش های معقول را توضیح می دهد: در نخستین مرحله اجماع بر سر قانون اساسی، اصول لیبرال عدالت، که در آغاز با اکراه بسان یک «سازش موقت» پذیرفته شده و به درون قانون اساسی راه یافته اند، می خواهند آموزه های فراگیر شهروندان را دگرگون کنند به گونه ای که آنان دست کم اصول یک قانون اساسی لیبرال را بپذیرند. این اصول حقوق و آزادی های اساسی ویژه ای را تضمین می کنند، و روندهای دموکراتیکی را برای پدیدآوری تعدیل در رقابت سیاسی، و برای تعیین موضوعات سیاسی اجتماعی پدید می آورند. تا این اندازه نگرش های فراگیر شهروندان را در چنین گستره ای می توان معقول دانست؛ تکثرگرایی صرف به سوی تکثرگرایی معقول پیش می رود و اجماع بر سر قانون اساسی به دست می آید رالز آزادی های تضمین شده در یک قانون اساسی لیبرال را فراتر از آزادی های صوری محض نمی انگارد. مرحله بعدی در طرح رالز حرکت از اجماع قانون اساسی به اجماع همپوش (جامعه استوار بر قانون اساسی عادلانه) است. با توجه به واقعیت تکثرگرایی معقول، اجماع همپوش بایستی بر یک برداشت سیاسی از عدالت که خودبنیاد است (به هیچ آموزه فراگیری وابسته نیست) پی ریزی شود. برداشت سیاسی پیشنهادی رالز "نظریه عدالت به مثابه انصاف" است. استدلال رالز با بررسی معقولیت و پایایی طرح پیشنهادی اش پایان می پذیرد. رالز در طول کتاب، آشنایی با نظریه عدالت به مثابه انصاف را فرض می گیرد؛ فقط بخش هایی از نظریه که به زعم رالز در ویرایش اول کتاب "نظریه ای در باب عدالت" کاستی هایی دارد بازبینی شده است. البته این تغییرات اکثرا در ویرایش نهایی کتاب نظریه ای در باب عدالت هم اعمال شده است. شاید بخش هایی از کتاب (به ویژه فصل پایانی) حاوی نکات جدیدی برای خوانندگان ویرایش نهایی نظریه نباشد، هر چند با توجه به خلاصه تر بیان شدن مطالب مطالعه آن خالی از لطف هم نیست.

  2. 4 out of 5

    Soha Bayoumi

    This book attempts to answer the question of how can a stable and just society of free and equal citizens live in a concord when deeply divided by reasonable but incompatible doctrines? Rawls's answer to the question puts forward his Political Liberalism, with the central idea of public reason. A must-read in my opinion.

  3. 5 out of 5

    Thom Willis

    "Rawls hated our God. Catholics ought to know that before they read him." - Andrew M. Greenwell, Esq. The great awfulness of this tome is that not only is it eminently boring (a "smokescreen of technicalities," Ralph Hancock calls it), but its thesis is swiftly refuted by Christopher Eberle in his book Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics. Don't waste your time trudging through Rawls. Instead read the pertinent chapter(s) of Eberle's book. Rawls' concern is noble enough: lay a groundwork for a "Rawls hated our God. Catholics ought to know that before they read him." - Andrew M. Greenwell, Esq. The great awfulness of this tome is that not only is it eminently boring (a "smokescreen of technicalities," Ralph Hancock calls it), but its thesis is swiftly refuted by Christopher Eberle in his book Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics. Don't waste your time trudging through Rawls. Instead read the pertinent chapter(s) of Eberle's book. Rawls' concern is noble enough: lay a groundwork for a just and stable (democratic) society in the midst of religious and philosophical pluralism. We all have a stake in this. His groundwork, "Political Liberalism", is ostensibly a module in which a variety of what he calls "comprehensive doctrines" (that is, worldviews) can coexist, but it is really based on a sort of relativism, mixed with a grossly intolerant lust for toleration. "Central to the idea of public reason is that it neither criticizes nor attacks any comprehensive doctrine, religious or nonreligious, except insofar as that doctrine is incompatible with the essentials of public reason and a democratic polity" (p.441). At first glance this may sound equitable. But even a surface evaluation of this statement reveals how tautological it is. Public reason criticizes nothing ... except for those doctrines with which it is incompatible. The same can be said of any ideology - Catholicism criticizes no doctrine, except insofar as that doctrine is incompatible with Catholicism's essentials. That is not an argument in any way for basing coercive laws on Catholic beliefs. "How is it possible - or is it - for those of faith, as well as the nonreligious (secular), to endorse a constitutional regime even when their comprehensive doctrines may not prosper under it, and indeed may decline?" (p.459) This is what Rawls demands of citizens - that they support a constitutional regime - his constitutional regime - over and above their own comprehensive doctrines. This is an unreasonable request, and demonstrates an astonishing misconception of the human person, which Eberle addresses in his book. Rawls' answer to the above question "lies in the religious or nonreligious doctrine's understanding and accepting that, except by endorsing a reasonable constitutional democracy, there is no other way fairly to ensure the liberty of its adherents consistent with the equal liberties of other reasonable free and equal citizens" (p.460). This is an incredibly ignorant sentence. Rawls seems totally unaware that adherents to comprehensive doctrines are incredibly likely to value the prosperity of their particular CDs far more than their own prosperity and liberty. The systems Rawls sets up is "just" by his own definition of the word, and yet by his own admission also distinguishes (that is, discriminates,) between comprehensive doctrines, holding them up to its own standard as either "reasonable" or "unreasonable." Rawls' pluralist society is in fact not true pluralism, but only limited pluralism, and survives by telling a certain group of people that they cannot continue to operate within society as they are now. This is no different from the Inquisitions and proverbial witch-hunts Rawls castigates at the beginning of his book. For his tolerant society to flourish, some belief systems cannot be tolerated. Rawls' doesn't "get" people. This is a fatal flaw of Political Liberalism. But he himself admits that he is unconcerned with people. "In political liberalism we try to avoid natural or psychological views ... accounts of human nature we put aside and rely on a political conception of persons as citizens instead" (p.482). Uhh, you can't do that buddy. You cannot discuss the human person without claiming some view of his nature. In the end Rawls is a relativist, and like other modern political philosophers, skirts dealing with the fact of pluralism by ignoring the Good and focusing instead on rights. "Justice as fairness" is his mantra, but it is inherently flawed, because the Truth is not "fair." It is necessarily discriminatory.

  4. 5 out of 5

    Sarah Myers

    Political Liberalism was my first foray into the work of John Rawls, the American philosopher at the back of much of contemporary liberalism, and it may have been better to read his other work, A Theory of Justice, first, since much of what he wrote in this book appears to be a development upon that other book and a response to the criticisms that were leveled against it. This made some parts of PL confusing, and I hope that I do not badly misrepresent Rawls in this review. At the very beginning Political Liberalism was my first foray into the work of John Rawls, the American philosopher at the back of much of contemporary liberalism, and it may have been better to read his other work, A Theory of Justice, first, since much of what he wrote in this book appears to be a development upon that other book and a response to the criticisms that were leveled against it. This made some parts of PL confusing, and I hope that I do not badly misrepresent Rawls in this review. At the very beginning (Introduction to the Paperback Edition), Rawls makes a crucial distinction between what he calls "comprehensive liberalism" and "political liberalism." The distinction appears to be a response to criticism that he claimed to be fair to all concepts of the good and actually substituting a liberal concept of good. Comprehensive liberalism may be identified with a broad scheme of ideas derived from the Enlightenment, intended to serve as the modern substitute for the older religious ideas. Clearly this kind of liberalism contains within itself its own values and ideas of the good. Political liberalism, on the other hand, is not entirely without an idea of the good, but its good is specifically limited. "[It] takes for granted the fact of reasonable pluralism of comprehensive doctrines, where some of those doctrines are taken to be nonliberal and religious," and therefore its "good" is to provide a just public space where all these views can meet on equal ground and work together in a stable political order. So in Political Liberalism, Rawls's project is to avoid comprehensive liberalism and show that political liberalism is able to provide a concept of justice that can rightly be endorsed by a variety of competing comprehensive views, not merely because the current balance of power more or less forces that upon them, but because an "overlapping consensus" can actually recognize it as just. We find a starting point for this overlapping consensus in the values that are already broadly shared in a democratic society: things such as equal liberties and freedom of thought and belief. The rest of the book develops this theme in a series of chapters originally given as lectures (but still very well tied together). At one point, Rawls does admit that although there is nothing inherent to the concept of political liberalism that is antagonistic to specific religious views or other comprehensive views of the good, the cultural climate of a politically liberal society may simply prove inhospitable to such views and it may be inevitable that some of them will die out. It could be that the passing of some of these comprehensive is to be regretted, but "no society can include within itself all forms of life." The recognition that not even political liberalism can produce a kind of utopian society where all views will live in peace is very honest (and shows the difficult challenges in front of those attempting to harmonize Christianity and democratic liberalism), but it is unclear to me why those holding specific religious or philosophical views should endorse the "overlapping consensus" if it is forseeable to them that doing so will ultimately spell the end of their way of life. If the space provided by Rawls's political liberalism does not ultimately provide for at least the majority of the major comprehensive views, then it seems to fail in what it set out to do. Also, I would have liked to see more practical examples of how Rawls's concepts would work out in American society as it actually is--though perhaps that is unrealistic to expect in a book that was already over 400 pages. In spite of my misgivings that Rawls's political ideas are not rooted in a realistic view of human persons, I was deeply impressed by the book, and I would venture to say that the real force and attraction of such a liberalism as Rawls's is not adequately dealt with by most conservatives. In spite of the book's heavily academic tone, I think it would contribute to anyone's ability to engage in the conversation regarding liberalism, democracy, and just government in a pluralist society. I highly recommend it.

  5. 5 out of 5

    Jacob Williams

    What this book offers: intriguing thoughts on living in a society characterized by deep disagreements What not to expect: enjoyment; actionable takeaways The only way you could have made this more boring would have been to interleave it with a phone book. And at least then there might've been a few funny ads to liven things up. Rawls’ style is to break down his worldview into a highly hierarchical outline and translate that unceremoniously into paragraph form. So you’re constantly reading about What this book offers: intriguing thoughts on living in a society characterized by deep disagreements What not to expect: enjoyment; actionable takeaways The only way you could have made this more boring would have been to interleave it with a phone book. And at least then there might've been a few funny ads to liven things up. Rawls’ style is to break down his worldview into a highly hierarchical outline and translate that unceremoniously into paragraph form. So you’re constantly reading about stuff like the “three ways in which the social aspect of human relationships is reflected in the content of the [two] principles of justice,” or the “four main kinds of variations in citizens’ capacities," or the “five essential elements of a conception of objectivity” (admittedly, I was pretty excited about that one). The degree of organization is admirable, but I would’ve liked more time spent upfront explaining why we should care; why his framework is a good way to view the world. The book feels heavy on exposition and comparatively light on argumentation. But it’s given me some concepts and ways of thinking that I really appreciate. One is the notion of reflective equilibrium. When you’re confronted with a question - let’s say, is it OK to steal to feed my baby? - do you try to answer it on the basis of fundamental abstract principles, like always obey Scripture or promote the greatest good for the greatest number? Or do you see what your intuition tells you about the specific case, and then judge the abstract principle on whether it agrees (hmm, if my holy book says it’s better to let my kid starve, maybe I should overlook its advice in this case… or at least reevaluate how I’m interpreting it)? To some extent we do both, and that’s a good thing. If our beliefs about concrete situations don’t seem to be compatible with our more general beliefs, that’s a warning sign that some of our beliefs are mistaken. But the correct change might be in one of multiple places. Maybe one of the more general beliefs is wrong, or maybe we need to bite the bullet and ignore our intuition about the concrete case (ideally, then, we’d have an explanation for why we have an incorrect intuition about that case), or maybe they actually are compatible and we just haven’t identified how to reconcile them yet. Updating our beliefs at all levels of abstraction is a never-ending process. When you encounter a compelling argument against a particular belief you hold, but changing it would be incompatible with some of your other beliefs, you have to consider whether you may be wrong about those others, even if they are what you consider more fundamental beliefs. You need to check whether the reasons for believing them are strong enough to outweigh the new argument you’ve come across, or whether there’s a different set of beliefs you could hold that makes better sense of all the available evidence and arguments. Rawls refers to this as a process of seeking “reflective equilibrium,” a state where you hold a coherent set of beliefs that account for your firmest convictions at all levels. I think discussions of some controversial issues would go a bit more smoothly if more people saw things this way. I’ve had too many conversations where we’re trying to discuss something like should the state allow same-sex marriage or should we have single-payer healthcare, and one participant won’t allow the conversation to proceed unless we can all come to agreement on what is the metaphysical basis of right and wrong and where does the government’s right to tax originate. But such foundational questions are extremely difficult to resolve, in part because one of the ways we judge foundational beliefs is whether their implications seem plausible. So it’s important to be able to discuss more down-to-earth issues individually and directly; doing so may eventually lead us to revise our opinions about more foundational issues. Or it may not. Another Rawlsian assumption that I’d love to see more widely accepted throughout our society is what he calls “the fact of reasonable pluralism.” This means simply that reasonable people will hold conflicting worldviews. You cannot expect that everyone will reach the same conclusion as you on important questions, and you should not assume that disagreement stems from stupidity or evil. Rawls has a nice partial list of explanations for why serious disagreements persist among reasonable people: a. The evidence—empirical and scientific—bearing on the case is conflicting and complex, and thus hard to assess and evaluate. b. Even where we agree fully about the kinds of considerations that are relevant, we may disagree about their weight, and so arrive at different judgments. c. To some extent all our concepts, and not only moral and political concepts, are vague and subject to hard cases; and this indeterminacy means that we must rely on judgment and interpretation (and on judgments about interpretations) within some range (not sharply specifiable) where reasonable persons may differ. d. To some extent (how great we cannot tell) the way we assess evidence and weigh moral and political values is shaped by our total experience, our whole course of life up to now; and our total experiences must always differ. … e. Often there are different kinds of normative considerations of different force on both sides of an issue and it is difficult to make an overall assessment. ... Given this reality of widespread, unresolvable, deep disagreement, how exactly are we supposed to have a society? That’s basically the question Political Liberalism is trying to address. Rawls thinks it’s possible to formulate a set of political principles that all reasonable worldviews (“comprehensive doctrines” in his terminology) could endorse, forming what he calls an “overlapping consensus”. Government officials are then expected to justify their actions and legislation purely in terms of those broadly-acceptable principles, relying only on so-called “public reason” instead of appealing directly to their own religious/philosophical doctrines. That sounds a bit like just try to find some common ground everyone can agree to, which wouldn’t exactly be earth-shattering advice, but the very disciplined and principled way Rawls approaches it is instructive. The reason he has to construct so many lists and categorizations - of, e.g., the powers that a person must have in order to function as a free and equal citizen in society - is so that he can then use them to constrain what kinds of arguments should be considered valid in public reasoning. This leads to interesting discussions of, for example, the freedom of political speech. In his view it’s not enough to show that a particular restriction on this freedom would have some kind of net benefit for society, since reasonable people may disagree on how to evaluate that supposed benefit. Rather, any restrictions must be justified on the grounds that they are necessary to create the conditions that enable people to exercise the powers of a citizen, which (if his theory succeeds) are grounds all reasonable people should recognize. Proverbially, “a good compromise is when both parties are dissatisfied”… I think Rawls demonstrates how you might go about building more stable, satisfying compromises, with their own internal logic that people can come to support enthusiastically (just as, for example most Americans enthusiastically support the freedom of speech enshrined in our bill of rights, even if such freedom is at best tolerated by their own religions). To what extent we could apply his way of thinking immediately to public life is not clear.

  6. 4 out of 5

    Valentina Salvatierra

    This book gives a compelling account of how it is possible, in today's pluralistic societies, to create an overlapping consensus on fundamental political issues. Highly recommended for anyone looking for a solid ideological foundation for a politically liberal worldview.

  7. 4 out of 5

    Jason Burke Murphy

    Everyone should wrestle with this book as it is one of the best efforts to lay a foundation for a fair politics. This book provides a vocabulary that makes political discussion more fruitful.

  8. 5 out of 5

    Nathan

    *Pre-ramble* [This is how I view Rawls at this time. Like many other texts (e.g. my review of Difference and Repetition by Deleuze) my stance is not static. It changes and evolves with time, study, and experience.] [Review] I took an entire seminar course on Political Liberalism, where we read this one text. I was deeply ambivalent about Rawls for a number of reason. On the one hand, I agreed on a theoretical level with his conclusions. It's a work of political philosophy formulated through *Pre-ramble* [This is how I view Rawls at this time. Like many other texts (e.g. my review of Difference and Repetition by Deleuze) my stance is not static. It changes and evolves with time, study, and experience.] [Review] I took an entire seminar course on Political Liberalism, where we read this one text. I was deeply ambivalent about Rawls for a number of reason. On the one hand, I agreed on a theoretical level with his conclusions. It's a work of political philosophy formulated through formal moral reasoning. A kind of reasoning where morality is framed in logical terms, much in the spirit of Kant. Next, he begins with the notion of a 'well-ordered society' - which is an abstract concept of what, I guess, is the ideal form of society where all needs are met and different parties are willing to come to terms with each other. His principles of rational (what is right and good for the individual) and the reasonable (what is right and good for the community) and the idea of placing the Right before the good are all principles I agree with. I also agree with the fact of reasonable pluralism, which is already integral to numerous constitutions. Where I have trouble with Rawls is how this formally constructed conception of a society moves to concrete actuality. Kant's conception of reason was transcendental and so was a priori - before experience. Meaning, experience itself was made possible by these transcendental a priori concepts. For Rawls -insofar as I understand - it's the other way around. We ought to construct our society on the basis of his idea of a well-ordered society, not based on imposition, but because it's the rational thing to do. Call me a naive realist, because I have trouble seeing how this ideal could be implemented. Unlike Hegel, who takes the concept of Right and allows it to unfold dialectically to its logical conclusion through tension and sublation, Rawls' ideal is pre-configured. My prof said that Rawls' was more concerned with constitutional matters rather than individual problems (I guess that even means municipal policy?). Some of Rawls' ideas can apply to constitutional matters (like the fact of reasonable pluralism), BUT the idea of an overlapping consensus requires hope for it to be actualized. I don't disagree with the idea, and it seems critical now more than ever (since we are in such a polarized epoch); it requires hope, faith (in making the model a reality), and effort on behalf of all parties. So, I suggest everyone read this book because while it might seem 'out there' if we apply Rawls' ideas, maybe, just maybe, an overlapping consensus could happen.

  9. 5 out of 5

    Michael

    What can I say? I was bored to tears, remembering most of the material from my college lectures. Also, it reminds me of how easy it is in academia to be disconnected from reality. Lots of idealism, but the world functions far too pragmatically and messily.

  10. 4 out of 5

    Sarah Staudt

    The Veil of Ignorance remains one of the most powerful metaphors I have encountered in modern philosophy.

  11. 4 out of 5

    Dave Peticolas

    Rawl's account of the possibility of a stable and just society in the presence of 'reasonable pluralism' -- the existence of mutually incompatible but reasonable compresensive doctrines.

  12. 4 out of 5

    Micah

    This is an excellent work in which John Rawls defends both the principles of justice—which include basic rights and liberties for all and equal opportunity to succeed—and the principles of public reason—which include being reasonable and refusing to impose ideology on politics. Unfortunately, I can't give the book five stars, because these are not the virtues practiced by so-called "liberals" , as Rawls claims, but only by CONSERVATIVES. 1) liberals HATE basic rights like religious freedom; only This is an excellent work in which John Rawls defends both the principles of justice—which include basic rights and liberties for all and equal opportunity to succeed—and the principles of public reason—which include being reasonable and refusing to impose ideology on politics. Unfortunately, I can't give the book five stars, because these are not the virtues practiced by so-called "liberals" , as Rawls claims, but only by CONSERVATIVES. 1) liberals HATE basic rights like religious freedom; only conservatives defend the religoius rights of bakers 2) liberals HATE equal opportunity to succeed and want no whites or men to ever have succes 3) liberals are always trying to impose their IDEOLOGY of """intersectionality""" on politics; conservatives are not ideological and just want people to love GOD more 4) there is NO SUCH things as a reasonable liberals, because they are all communists

  13. 4 out of 5

    James Spencer

    Many years ago, I first came across John Rawls A Theory of Justice in law school and as an ex-engineer was astounded by the thinking behind it and it's conceptions. Still, it wasn't until reading Political Liberalism that I think I understood the significance as well as the limitations of Justice As Fairness. In Political Liberalism, Rawls makes clear that he does not see the Theory as a comprehensive philosophical conception of the good but rather a theory of how a modern liberal democratic Many years ago, I first came across John Rawls A Theory of Justice in law school and as an ex-engineer was astounded by the thinking behind it and it's conceptions. Still, it wasn't until reading Political Liberalism that I think I understood the significance as well as the limitations of Justice As Fairness. In Political Liberalism, Rawls makes clear that he does not see the Theory as a comprehensive philosophical conception of the good but rather a theory of how a modern liberal democratic society should function so as to permit the plurality of comprehensive conceptions of the good that a permanent fact of our world. While a liberal democracy cannot chose one of these conceptions over another, it can establish background justice so that these overlapping conceptions can be expressed by all citizens as free and rational. Not an easy read, it nevertheless is in my opinion a great work and in the end served the purpose that Rawls says that was to serve: to present "a way for [citizens in a constitutional regime] to conceive of their common and guaranteed status as equal citizens and [to attempt] to connect a particular conception of the person thought to be congenial to the shared notions and essential convictions implicit in the public culture of a democratic society."

  14. 5 out of 5

    Cosmo

    I have grown to like Political Liberalism more than A Theory of Justice. Nonetheless, I find Rawls frustrating; it feels like he reveals and rationalizes all the hidden assumptions and beliefs that I have taken for granted. Confronted with those beliefs--even when rationalized as systematically and thoroughly as Rawls does--something seems not quite right.

  15. 4 out of 5

    Leonardo

    El orden liberal del Imperio busca el tipo de “consenso superpuesto” propuesto por John Rawls, en el cual se les pide a todos deponer sus “doctrinas comprensivas” en interés de la tolerancia. Imperio Pág.149 En este libro se discute el "hecho del pluralismo".

  16. 4 out of 5

    Jonathan

    I don't agree with it (taken as a whole), but I think Rawls' categories are incredibly interesting and useful. For Christians, the book seems to offer an intriguing secularization of Augustine's two cities theory.

  17. 4 out of 5

    Daniel

    Published 20 years later, this is a follow up to A Theory of Justice, where Rawls addresses the question "How can we possibly generate any principles of justice on which members of a diverse society (religiously, politically, socio-economically) would agree?

  18. 4 out of 5

    Francisco mejia

    Still the best This expanded version of Political Liberalism is fantastic. Particularly the closing essay rounds Rawls ideas extremely well and paves the way for better understanding the contested world in which we live in today.

  19. 4 out of 5

    Charles

    Far better and more important than Theory of Justice, I think.

  20. 4 out of 5

    Saeid

    A wonderful book that indicate his Political Turn, also required reading for every one with an interest in Rawls's political philosophy and his amendments after A Theory of Justice...

  21. 5 out of 5

    Chris

    great

  22. 5 out of 5

    Ft. Sheridan

    Poo-blic Reason!

  23. 5 out of 5

    Don

    Like his theory of justice but even worse. A pallid defense of the lack of need for international redistribution (which, of course, his theory of justice implies).

  24. 5 out of 5

    Richard Cai

    A good model for "Realistic Utopian" society, somewhat undermines my Libertarian tradition, but still difficult to practice because few people have public reason

  25. 4 out of 5

    Joe

    I need to read this again AFTER reading A Theory of Justice.

  26. 4 out of 5

    Kamaryn Brown

  27. 5 out of 5

    Jeff

  28. 4 out of 5

    John

  29. 5 out of 5

    Theodor W. Coltrane

  30. 5 out of 5

    Marie Pascale Geist

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