counter create hit The Russian Military Today and Tomorrow - Putin, Russian Navy, Ukraine, Gazprom, Rosneft, Lavrov, Deep Operations, Campaign Design, Russian-Chinese Security Relations, Mafia and Arms Dealers - Download Free eBook
Hot Best Seller

The Russian Military Today and Tomorrow - Putin, Russian Navy, Ukraine, Gazprom, Rosneft, Lavrov, Deep Operations, Campaign Design, Russian-Chinese Security Relations, Mafia and Arms Dealers

Availability: Ready to download

Two excellent studies from the U.S. Army's Strategic Studies Institute provide unique insights into the current state of the Russian military. Topics and subjects covered include: Putin's Navy, Ukraine, Gazprom, Rosneft, the Russian-Georgian Conflict, Russian-Chinese Security Relations, Lavrov, Iran, Chechnya, Russian Mafia and Arms Dealers, Blitzkrieg, Deep Operations, ca Two excellent studies from the U.S. Army's Strategic Studies Institute provide unique insights into the current state of the Russian military. Topics and subjects covered include: Putin's Navy, Ukraine, Gazprom, Rosneft, the Russian-Georgian Conflict, Russian-Chinese Security Relations, Lavrov, Iran, Chechnya, Russian Mafia and Arms Dealers, Blitzkrieg, Deep Operations, campaign design, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, South Ossetia, Siloviki, Yukos, and more. The Russian Military Today and Tomorrow - Contents include: 1. "No Need to Threaten Us, We Are Frightened of Ourselves," Russia's Blueprint for a Police State, The New Security Strategy * 2. Is Military Reform in Russia for "Real"? Yes, But * 3. Operational Art and the Curious Narrative on the Russian Contribution: Presence and Absence Over the Last 2 Decades. * 4. Russian Information Warfare Theory: The Consequences of August 2008 * 5. Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces and Arms Control: Deja Vu All Over Again * 6. The Challenge of Understanding the Russian Navy * 7. Russian Military Challenges Toward Central-East Europe * 8. Russian-Chinese Security Relations: Constant and Changing - Western interest in this field sharply declined after the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. To many, the issues and questions involved in this field, not to mention the effort connected with obtaining funding for such study, seemed to be irrelevant and not worth the time spent in doing so. Yet, recent events have shown that this approach is seriously misguided and involves major costs to the United States and its allies. Of course, it is by now a truism to say that the Russo-Georgian war of 2008 demonstrated to all observers that "Russia was back," if they had not realized that before. But in fact, as Stephen Blank points out in Chapter 2, Russian military and political leaders well before then believed that Russia was at risk in both military and nonmilitary ways. Some went so far as to say that the country was, in effect, already in an information war against the West. We often underestimate the impact of the Russian leadership's perception that Russia is intrinsically at risk, and in some sense under attack, from the West. That underestimation leads us astray, conceptually but also politically. It causes us to ignore some of the most vital and foundational issues in Russian defense policy, e.g., the relationship between the military and the civilian government and the importance of doctrinal statements and threat assessments. Civil-Military Relations in Medvedev's Russia - The Russian military has successfully persuaded the government to accept its expansive concept of the threats to Russia, i.e., its threat assessment. That threat assessment is one that postulates growing military threats from without, mainly from the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), an increased likelihood of the incidence of war, and, in general, a presupposition of political, if not military, conflict with the West that preserves the state of siege in world politics inaugurated by Vladimir Lenin. Moreover, this threat assessment also postulates increasing domestic threats to the security of the present political order and links those threats, as would a Leninist approach, to the same external adversaries, if not enemies, postulated in the external threat assessment. Yet despite this structural militarization of Russia's cognitive and policy approach to its security dilemmas, the military has only partly succeeded in convincing the government to accept its answers to these dilemmas. Those answers essentially entail returning to a form of mobilization even though defense spending, in a bow to the military, will reach unprecedented levels in 2010 despite the current economic crisis. This situation of inflated threat assessments leading to pro-military policy outcomes is a direct result of the enduring failure to establish democratic controls.


Compare

Two excellent studies from the U.S. Army's Strategic Studies Institute provide unique insights into the current state of the Russian military. Topics and subjects covered include: Putin's Navy, Ukraine, Gazprom, Rosneft, the Russian-Georgian Conflict, Russian-Chinese Security Relations, Lavrov, Iran, Chechnya, Russian Mafia and Arms Dealers, Blitzkrieg, Deep Operations, ca Two excellent studies from the U.S. Army's Strategic Studies Institute provide unique insights into the current state of the Russian military. Topics and subjects covered include: Putin's Navy, Ukraine, Gazprom, Rosneft, the Russian-Georgian Conflict, Russian-Chinese Security Relations, Lavrov, Iran, Chechnya, Russian Mafia and Arms Dealers, Blitzkrieg, Deep Operations, campaign design, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, South Ossetia, Siloviki, Yukos, and more. The Russian Military Today and Tomorrow - Contents include: 1. "No Need to Threaten Us, We Are Frightened of Ourselves," Russia's Blueprint for a Police State, The New Security Strategy * 2. Is Military Reform in Russia for "Real"? Yes, But * 3. Operational Art and the Curious Narrative on the Russian Contribution: Presence and Absence Over the Last 2 Decades. * 4. Russian Information Warfare Theory: The Consequences of August 2008 * 5. Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces and Arms Control: Deja Vu All Over Again * 6. The Challenge of Understanding the Russian Navy * 7. Russian Military Challenges Toward Central-East Europe * 8. Russian-Chinese Security Relations: Constant and Changing - Western interest in this field sharply declined after the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. To many, the issues and questions involved in this field, not to mention the effort connected with obtaining funding for such study, seemed to be irrelevant and not worth the time spent in doing so. Yet, recent events have shown that this approach is seriously misguided and involves major costs to the United States and its allies. Of course, it is by now a truism to say that the Russo-Georgian war of 2008 demonstrated to all observers that "Russia was back," if they had not realized that before. But in fact, as Stephen Blank points out in Chapter 2, Russian military and political leaders well before then believed that Russia was at risk in both military and nonmilitary ways. Some went so far as to say that the country was, in effect, already in an information war against the West. We often underestimate the impact of the Russian leadership's perception that Russia is intrinsically at risk, and in some sense under attack, from the West. That underestimation leads us astray, conceptually but also politically. It causes us to ignore some of the most vital and foundational issues in Russian defense policy, e.g., the relationship between the military and the civilian government and the importance of doctrinal statements and threat assessments. Civil-Military Relations in Medvedev's Russia - The Russian military has successfully persuaded the government to accept its expansive concept of the threats to Russia, i.e., its threat assessment. That threat assessment is one that postulates growing military threats from without, mainly from the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), an increased likelihood of the incidence of war, and, in general, a presupposition of political, if not military, conflict with the West that preserves the state of siege in world politics inaugurated by Vladimir Lenin. Moreover, this threat assessment also postulates increasing domestic threats to the security of the present political order and links those threats, as would a Leninist approach, to the same external adversaries, if not enemies, postulated in the external threat assessment. Yet despite this structural militarization of Russia's cognitive and policy approach to its security dilemmas, the military has only partly succeeded in convincing the government to accept its answers to these dilemmas. Those answers essentially entail returning to a form of mobilization even though defense spending, in a bow to the military, will reach unprecedented levels in 2010 despite the current economic crisis. This situation of inflated threat assessments leading to pro-military policy outcomes is a direct result of the enduring failure to establish democratic controls.

9 review for The Russian Military Today and Tomorrow - Putin, Russian Navy, Ukraine, Gazprom, Rosneft, Lavrov, Deep Operations, Campaign Design, Russian-Chinese Security Relations, Mafia and Arms Dealers

  1. 5 out of 5

    Scott Holstad

    Typically excellent little DoD publication. Always pretty solid content, although they clearly pay nothing for layout since there is none at all, nor do they pay for design or anything else a "traditional" print publisher would expect. However, I suspect that doesn't matter to its readers, of which I'm the only one I know of! LOL! I've bought and read DOZENS of these over the years and I have yet to see any customer reviews on Goodreads, LibraryThing or Amazon in all of my years of looking and a Typically excellent little DoD publication. Always pretty solid content, although they clearly pay nothing for layout since there is none at all, nor do they pay for design or anything else a "traditional" print publisher would expect. However, I suspect that doesn't matter to its readers, of which I'm the only one I know of! LOL! I've bought and read DOZENS of these over the years and I have yet to see any customer reviews on Goodreads, LibraryThing or Amazon in all of my years of looking and all of my tons of DoD publications I purchase. They seem to be publishing only for me. Which can't be true, but even if it were likely plausible, would be pretty say because usually the content in these small books is very high quality and thus my only "real" complaint is they usually don't see the need to publish new editions, so while this book should still have a lot of valuable info in it as it's just a bit over 5 years old, many others on perhaps more "timely" topics are woefully out of date and of little practical use. Another example: one of these DoD books was published on geopolitical issues brew in the SCS as China branches out and starts acting the bully, so the author pondered the possibility of a defense treaty between the US and Vietnam, specifically, while also mentioning India, Indonesia, the Philippines, etc. The trouble is while that book was published around the same time, a LOT has happened in the SCS area since and is still happening today and things are much more complex today than 2015, so suggested tactics and doctrine are really obsolete now, making the book interesting as a potential historical relic, but otherwise totally useless. Ultimately then, this is a pretty good book, but because there have been and still are so many ongoing changes in many ways going on in Eurasia now, how relevant will this information be by the time you read it? Well, since I appear to be the only reader of all these books, maybe it won't matter since I tend to stay current on all of this stuff, but in any event, a bit outdated, but as the DoD book that it is, typically good content and worth the investment. Recommended.

  2. 4 out of 5

    Tony Selhorst

  3. 5 out of 5

    Vincent

  4. 5 out of 5

    Mike

  5. 4 out of 5

    Amanda Burd

  6. 4 out of 5

    Bouju

  7. 4 out of 5

    Stephen A. Wyatt

  8. 4 out of 5

    SuperSimpleDriver1949

  9. 5 out of 5

    Krzysiek (Chris)

Add a review

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Loading...
We use cookies to give you the best online experience. By using our website you agree to our use of cookies in accordance with our cookie policy.