counter create hit White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961 - Download Free eBook
Ads Banner
Hot Best Seller
Ads Banner

30 review for White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961

  1. 5 out of 5

    Amr Mohamed

    اولأ تقييم الكتاب بأربع نجوم لأهمية ما جاء بالكتاب من معلومات وليس طبعا لصاحب المذكرات فمحروقة أمريكا على رؤسائها من واشنطن حتى اوباما تكلمت فى مذكرات انتونى ايدن عن وقوف امريكا مع مصر ضد العدوان الثلاثى , وان الكلام ان امريكا كرهت ناصر بعد صفقة السلاح وسحب التمويل كلام مش سليم كان بعدها بس بفترة , قلت مرارا ان ناصر ليس عميلا ولكن كانت مصالح امريكا متفقة مع مصالح ناصر فى تلك الفترة , وتلك المذكرات جاءت لتؤكد هذا الكلام ايضاً وتلك بعض النقاط التى توضح موقف امريكا من الوقوف بجانب مصر وعدم الوقوف بجان اولأ تقييم الكتاب بأربع نجوم لأهمية ما جاء بالكتاب من معلومات وليس طبعا لصاحب المذكرات فمحروقة أمريكا على رؤسائها من واشنطن حتى اوباما تكلمت فى مذكرات انتونى ايدن عن وقوف امريكا مع مصر ضد العدوان الثلاثى , وان الكلام ان امريكا كرهت ناصر بعد صفقة السلاح وسحب التمويل كلام مش سليم كان بعدها بس بفترة , قلت مرارا ان ناصر ليس عميلا ولكن كانت مصالح امريكا متفقة مع مصالح ناصر فى تلك الفترة , وتلك المذكرات جاءت لتؤكد هذا الكلام ايضاً وتلك بعض النقاط التى توضح موقف امريكا من الوقوف بجانب مصر وعدم الوقوف بجانب فرنسا وبريطانيا فى حرب السويس قبل العدوان كان موقف أمريكا وايزنهاور : 1- أمريكا تشكك بعدم صحة الموقف القانوني الذي سوف تستخدمه بريطانيا وفرنسا ضد مصر.... ومنذ متى تهتم امريكا بالقانون فهى اكثر دولة انتهكت القوانين 2- يقول ايزنهاور اى دولة ويقصد مصر استخدمت حقها فى مصادرة الملكية داخل اراضيها فمن النادر ان يشك احد فى موقفها او يقف ضد رغبتها.. 3- شكك فى كلام ايدن عندما قال ان من الصعب إدارة القناة بدون مرشدين اجانب وقال ايزنهاور انه من الممكن إداراتها من قبل المصريين.. وفى 14 سبتمبر ترك المرشدين الاجانب القناة وقال ايزنهاور مدافعا عن مصر ان المصرين اثبتوا كفاءة عالية فى إدارة القناة ومرت 254 سفينة بدون توقف...لذلك اى فكرة لاستعمال القوة ستكون سخيفة 4- قال لبريطانيا وفرنسا من الصعب تشجيع السيطرة الغير مبررة على دولة صغيرة بواسطة جيوش أجنبية 5- علم ايزنهاور وهو بالمستشفى ان يوجد تعبئة عامة فى اسرائيل فأرسل لبن جوريون حتى لا يقوم بعمل يكون ضد السلام..وقال ان ابا ابيان كذاب وان التعبئة العامة ليست للدفاع بعد بداية العدوان من اسرائيل وبعدها بريطانيا وفرنسا: 6- أقام ايزنهاور مؤتمر صحفى وقال ان امريكا تعهدت باتفاقية بين امريكا وبريطانيا وفرنسا للمحافظة على الوضع الراهن فى الشرق الاوسط وسوف تحارب اى استيلاء على ارض بقوة السلاح , ثم ارسل الى القائم بالاعمال البريطانى وقال له ان امريكا سوف تلتزم بالاتفاقية وستذهب صباحاً للأمم المتحدة قبل حتى الاتحاد السوفيتى.. 7- بعد انذار بريطانيا وفرنسا ارسل اليهم ينكر الانذار واى حل يتم بالقوة 8- أمر دالاس بإلقاء بيان بوقف جميع المساعدات لاسرائيل , وتقديم مشروع قرارا للأمم المتحدة بطلب سحب قوات اسرائيل الى ما وراء خطوط الهدنة 9- عندما انسحبت القوات البريطانية والفرنسية ورفضت اسرائيل الانسحاب الا بشروط, ارسل ايزنهاور عدة مرات لاسرائيل لتقبل بالانسسحاب وقال انها كسبت من الحرب قتل الفدائيين والمرور بخليج العقبة وهذا صحيح فقد كسبت اسرائيل ولكن كذبا قلنا ان مصر هى من كسبت من تلك الحرب . وبعد ذلك اقام ايزنهاور مؤتمر صحفى وقال اذا احتلت دولة جزء من بلد ثانى وكان هذه ضد موافقة الامم المتحدة هل يسمح لها لفرض شروط لانسحابها.. الكلام بدون تعليق فمن يقرأ هذا يتخيل ان موقف أمريكا هذا كان مع اسرائيل وأن مصر هى من قامت بالهجوم وليس العكس.. يعنى كان ناقص يضرب اسرائيل جوي عشان نقول ان امريكا كانت مع مصر فى حرب السويس الجديد فى الكتاب أنه يوجد به معلومة كنت أول مرة اقرأ عنها وهي ان العراق والاردن ولبنان وتركيا فى عام 1957 كانوا قلقين من حكومة شكري القوتلى فى سوريا وان سوريا ستكون شيوعية وانهم يريدون محاربة سوريا وسألوا امريكا كيف ستساعدهم فى الحرب ضد سوريا لأن أمريكا طبعا لا تريد اى حكم شيوعي فى المنطقة , واخر الاتفاقات ان العراق تريد الهجوم ولكن خائفة على أنابيب النفط التى تمر من سوريا واما تركيا فحشدت 50 الف من قواتها على الحدود, ما الذى حدث بعد ذلك فطمأن امريكا والعراق العميلة حكومة نورى سعيد الذي كان يتم شتمه يوميا فى اذاعة صوت العرب, وطمأن بقية الدول.. الذى حدث الاتحاد بين مصر وسوريا فقضى ناصر على جميع الاحزاب ومنع ممارسة النشاط الشيوعي.. فشكرا لناصر على طمأنه أمريكا من المد الشيوعي يوجد بعد ذلك بعض المعلومات المهمة عن الكونغو, وكوبا وكاسترو وعن نزول القوات الأمريكية فى لبنان, كتاب مهم ويؤرخ لفترة مهمة جداً

  2. 4 out of 5

    Aaron Million

    This is the second volume of Eisenhower's presidential memoirs, picking up in mid-1956 where the first volume, Mandate for Change, concludes. Much of the first part of the book is taken up with the Suez Crisis, with Eisenhower skillfully keeping the U.S. Neutral and – in a rarity – not aligning itself with or supporting the actions taken by Britain, France, and Israel. While not immune from criticism, due to his high stature throughout the country and the world, Eisenhower's non-action was accep This is the second volume of Eisenhower's presidential memoirs, picking up in mid-1956 where the first volume, Mandate for Change, concludes. Much of the first part of the book is taken up with the Suez Crisis, with Eisenhower skillfully keeping the U.S. Neutral and – in a rarity – not aligning itself with or supporting the actions taken by Britain, France, and Israel. While not immune from criticism, due to his high stature throughout the country and the world, Eisenhower's non-action was accepted much better than it would have been had most other presidents done the same thing. Eisenhower provides multiple maps relating to the various world situations that he had to grapple with, an example being the disputed islands of Quemoy and Matsu off the coast of China. The maps are on glossy, white-black-gray pages located in the middle of the book. It would have been more convenient for the maps to have been placed into the sections of the book discussing that part of the world, instead of each time having to mark your place and go to the middle of the book. Also, the black and gray on the maps are so similar – and on one map in particular, about Hungary and the nations surrounding it – that it is very difficult to distinguish the different countries (the Communist countries were in dark gray, the NATO countries in black). The frontispiece has a nice world map showing Eisenhower's global travels while in office. Concerning civil rights, Eisenhower sees his actions through a Constitutional lens. He indicates that it is not necessarily important what he thinks, but rather the most important thing that he can do is to effectively carry out the law of the land, whatever it may be and whether or not he personally agrees with it. On page 150, writing about the Brown v Board Supreme Court decision, he writes: “The Court's judgment was law... and I would abide by it..... I believed that if I should express, publicly, either approval or disapproval of a Supreme Court decision in one case, I would be obliged to so in many, if not all, cases.” This, in turn, “...could tend to lower the dignity of government, and would, in the long run, be hurtful.” Viewing matters from this perspective, Eisenhower has a point – he would be asked about any controversial Supreme Court decisions as long as was President, and this could possibly overstep the checks and balances that separate the three branches of the U.S. Government. Yet, there have been many critics over the ensuing decades who have written that Eisenhower missed a golden opportunity to provide moral leadership to the country, that he could have used his popularity combined with the power and authority of the presidency to give a big boost to the growing civil rights movement. They too have a point. Eisenhower knew that there was widespread discrimination against blacks in the country, especially in the South. In 1957, when the clash with Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus occurred, he was already Constitutionally barred from seeking a third term and thus would not appear on a ballot again. One might think that this would have allowed Eisenhower more room to maneuver, to take a strong moral stand. But he declined to do so. There were two reasons that, belatedly, intervened against Faubus: constitutional (the Governor was defying a Supreme Court decision) and personal (Faubus lied to him). While Eisenhower did not stand in the way of civil rights advancements, in this instance he acted only when necessary, and then only when Constitutionally obligated to do so. For a man who exercised magnificent leadership many times throughout his career, he came up woefully short in this area. This is not to say that Eisenhower was necessarily a racist. While certainly not progressive on civil rights, he did not move to block its progress either. In fact, he did support the 1957 Civil Rights Act, and believed strongly that all citizens desired to have the right to vote. One must remember the context within which the man himself lived: he grew up in central Kansas in the 1890s, joined and served in a largely segregated Army (Eisenhower, along with Harry Truman, was in favor of desegregating the Army in the late 1940s), and was surrounded by people of the same generation. So, his reticence to lead on civil rights while he was President, while unfortunate to be sure, is not necessarily surprising given his own life experiences. In his own view, he closes the chapter by quoting parts of a letter that he wrote to a friend about this situation (page 175): “If the day comes when we can obey the orders of our courts only when we personally approve of them, the end of the American system, as we know it, will not be far off.” One wonders, given that sentence, what Eisenhower would think about the current state of affairs in the United States. Eisenhower devotes a few pages to discussing the admission of statehood for both Alaska and Hawaii. Eisenhower supported it for both states, seemingly at first because it was part of the Republican platform in 1952. But after reviewing the matter more thoroughly, he believed that Hawaii had a better case due mainly to its economy, while with Alaska he came to realize the military significance of having U.S. personnel so close to Russia (western Alaska is just across the Bering Strait from the edge of Russian territory). This makes sense once one thinks about it, yet it is not something that I have seen written anywhere else. Not surprisingly, Eisenhower is at his best when writing about military and/or foreign policy issues. Having spent his life devoted to those areas, he has a truly unique and highly respected view on world affairs, military needs, and global conflicts. He had a firm grasp of the many complexities in the world, and on the motivations of the many leaders that he corresponded and visited with. Eisenhower is quite loyal to those who served him well and earned his respect. He devoted a chapter each to Sherman Adams, who was his Chief of Staff and was forced to resign over a bribery/gift scandal that today would be considered low on the totem pole of abuse of power, and John Foster Dulles, the austere and ardent anti-Communist Secretary of State. On the Adams episode, Eisenhower downplays Richard Nixon's role in attempting to persuade Adams to resign. Eisenhower only briefly mentions Nixon's involvement. See Nixon's Memoirs for a much more detailed - and different – interpretation. Basically, Eisenhower – like Nixon later – had an extremely hard time in directly asking for someone's resignation. With Dulles, who died a painful death from cancer in 1959, Eisenhower is much more open about his admiration for the man. They worked closely together, and Eisenhower greatly valued his judgment, believing him to be a patriot who sacrificed his health to help promote and protect American interests throughout the world. This is a different picture of Dulles than the one painted in many books discussing U.S. 1950s foreign policy. By contrast, Richard Nixon gets much cooler and more detached treatment. By now it is no secret that the two men had a difficult, strained relationship. While Eisenhower never comes out and says this, he in effect admits it by what he does not say. He does praise Nixon's willingness to help the Republican Party, and he acknowledges the many committees and assignments that Nixon capably handled. But there is no warmth there. When writing of Nixon's defeat in the 1960 presidential election, one gets the sense that Eisenhower is much disappointed that a Republican administration did not continue in power, than he personally was upset that Nixon lost. If you are looking for anecdotes or the personal side of Eisenhower's life in the White House, you will have to look elsewhere. Always known as a private individual, he rarely lifts the curtain to provide a glimpse of his family life or what personal feelings he had about being President. His wife, Mamie, appears irregularly and only for brief periods. Occasionally, he will interject some dry humor, such as when he was writing about his Middle Eastern trip in December 1959, pp. 486-487: “Upon graduating from West Point, I was asked, as was then customary, to express my preference for a duty station. 'The Philippines,' I replied.... The Army sent me to Texas.” Eisenhower concludes the book with a long chapter about his overall view of the presidency, and some suggestions that he has for making the democratic process run much more smoothly in the future. Among other items, one thing he mentions is that, since the 22nd Amendment limits a person being able to be President to two terms, perhaps Congressmen should have term limits also. Another is that the term for members of the House of Representatives should be increased from two to four years so that the Congressmen are not in perpetual campaign mode. This is a satisfying conclusion to Eisenhower's presidential year. While a few parts of the book can become bogged down in diplomatic strategy or military force discussions, and some things are not mentioned (such as his line about if Nixon had ever made a recommendation that Eisenhower followed: “If you give me a week, I might think of one.”), overall Eisenhower provides a candid if at times personally detached view of his second term as President.

  3. 5 out of 5

    Will

    Statesmanlike, "peace loving" second-term Ike is infinitely better than "coup em and bomb em" first-term Ike. You do get an impression in this book that Ike was deeply concerned about the increasingly over-the-top military spending but one must rectify this with the fact he didn't do anything to stop it. Except, that is, building more nukes, which is a rather problematic solution to anything. Read if you are interested in U.S. foreign policy in the 1950s, but don't expect too much discussion on Statesmanlike, "peace loving" second-term Ike is infinitely better than "coup em and bomb em" first-term Ike. You do get an impression in this book that Ike was deeply concerned about the increasingly over-the-top military spending but one must rectify this with the fact he didn't do anything to stop it. Except, that is, building more nukes, which is a rather problematic solution to anything. Read if you are interested in U.S. foreign policy in the 1950s, but don't expect too much discussion on domestic issues, outside one interesting chapter on race.

  4. 5 out of 5

    Michael Parent

  5. 4 out of 5

    Rjrvt

  6. 4 out of 5

    Ahmed Basra

  7. 5 out of 5

    Noel

  8. 5 out of 5

    Gretchen Vice

  9. 4 out of 5

    Radhwane Bouchama

  10. 5 out of 5

    JE KH

  11. 5 out of 5

    Howard

  12. 4 out of 5

    Daniel

  13. 5 out of 5

    Belal A.

  14. 5 out of 5

    Thom Dunn

  15. 5 out of 5

    Roxanne

  16. 4 out of 5

    Tim Downie

  17. 5 out of 5

    John Lagana

  18. 4 out of 5

    Adam Boon

  19. 4 out of 5

    Allan

  20. 4 out of 5

    Meihan Liu

    A faithful account. Done with the second Taiwan Strait Crisis part. A good companion to the FRUS documents on this incident. It is almost stunning to see how almost the entire administration, and the bureaucracy, and the military viewed this crisis through the lens of the Domino Theory, despite of their minor divergences on issues such as whether to send the ChiComs a strong hard-line statement or keep them guessing American intentions. Almost like a concerted approach. "Free China’s loss of the A faithful account. Done with the second Taiwan Strait Crisis part. A good companion to the FRUS documents on this incident. It is almost stunning to see how almost the entire administration, and the bureaucracy, and the military viewed this crisis through the lens of the Domino Theory, despite of their minor divergences on issues such as whether to send the ChiComs a strong hard-line statement or keep them guessing American intentions. Almost like a concerted approach. "Free China’s loss of these islands would almost inevitably lead to attacks on Taiwan in which the free world has such a vital stake." Who could guess what would happen later back then.

  21. 4 out of 5

    Matt Walters

  22. 4 out of 5

    Tom

  23. 4 out of 5

    Geoffrey Kabaservice

  24. 4 out of 5

    Jeff

  25. 5 out of 5

    Daniel

  26. 4 out of 5

    إبراهيم حسين

  27. 4 out of 5

    Rusty Wright

  28. 5 out of 5

    Youcef

  29. 5 out of 5

    Scott Mugno

  30. 4 out of 5

    Pamela Jo

Add a review

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Loading...
We use cookies to give you the best online experience. By using our website you agree to our use of cookies in accordance with our cookie policy.